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Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationship between timely recognition of losses in financial reporting and 
investment efficiency, claiming that accounting conservatism improves the investment efficiency through 
mitigating under (over) investments of firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). For this purpose, annual 
reports of 142 firms were selected on sample basis from six different sectors covering the period from 2006 to 
2011. We find the existence of conservatism in financial reporting of Pakistani firms which was measured 
through Basu (1997) model, later to develop hypotheses that conservatism improves investment efficiency by 
alleviating firms from under and over-investments. The results found that accounting conservatism improves 
investment efficiency of Pakistani firms at insignificant level; however we found that conservatism restricts 
firms from over-investments at highly significant level. Furthermore, we find significant relation of CEO duality 
with investment efficiency and conservatism, which inferred that CEO duality, has influenced to improve 
investment efficiency in Pakistan. As a first study in context of Pakistan, it plays an important role in academic 
literature of accounting from developing country. 
Keywords: Investment efficiency, Conservatism, Corporate Governance, Pakistan.  
 
1. Introduction 
Accounting conservatism is lavishly debated and being discussed by academic researchers. Basu (1997) claimed 
that conservatism exists in our accounting system since many years and stated that conservatism is recognition of 
bad news (losses) as compared to good news (gains). Similarly, Watts (2003) also defined that conservatism is 
realization of losses before gains in reporting. Many studies documented that conservatism improves investment 
efficiency. Investment efficiency is how the companies utilize their financial resources for profitability or 
sustainability of the business. We can define investment efficiency as the ratio of investment in positive NPV 
and negative NPV projects selections for investment, also refer as under or over-investment respectively. In line 
with prior research, this study also contributes to the existing literature of conservatism and investment 
efficiency, Biddle (2009), Lara et al., (2010, 2015) and Tao Ma (2014) explained accounting conservatism cause 
(improve) investment efficiency and also sheds light on conservatism association with managers investment 
incentives and corporate governance. They also explained conditional conservatism reduces (causes) firms from 
under/over investments. The empirical research investigates that conditional conservatism alleviates the firms 
from under-overinvestment. We find that accounting conservatism exist in accounting system of Pakistan. In 
addition to this, we also found that accounting conservatism causes to reduce the firms from overinvestment. 
While this study did not provide any evidence that accounting conservatism alleviates Pakistani firms from under 
investment. In sum, we examine that conditional conservatism improve firm’s investment efficiency. However, 
we did not find a significant positive relationship of conservatism and investment efficiency, and alleviates firms 
from underinvestment. 
Accounting literature about accounting conservatism and investment decision or managers investment 
incentives reveal two views , one is related to under(over) investment and another is managers incentives and 
agency cost (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). Accounting conservatism can constraint the managers and decrease 
agency problem which caused to firms from overinvestment. While on the other hand accounting conservatism 
causes to abnormal or not performing well investment incentives for managers and waive them to give up 
positive NPV projects relating to firms underinvestment (Watts, 2003; Guay and Vierrecchia, 2007; Roy 
chowdhury, 2010). Further according to Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990), Firms overinvested by managers make 
excessive use of free cash flow in negative NPV projects and managers involvement in personal benefits become 
cause of agency problem. 
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Conservatism expected to give the access to external funds at lower cost and decrease firm’s 
underinvestment chances in absence of agency problem (Chen et al. 2007). Conservatism controls managers 
from manipulation in accounting, provide access to other sources and gives timely warning signals to corporate 
governance (Guay and Verrecchia, 2007; Duellman, 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008). Jackson et al. (2009) 
examine firms that may use conservatism approach have huge capital investment which is consistent with theory 
that conservatism affects the investment decisions, whether this caused to increase investment efficiency. Some 
studies fail to explain that conservatism causes to underinvestment problem. This paper contributes to find that 
conservatism cause (reduce) the firms from under or overinvestment. Conservative firms are less likely to under 
or overinvest at good investment level (Lara et al. 2010).Timely loss recognition restricts the manager to pursue 
less risky projects and discourage to invest in negative net present value projects, it may cause to affect manger 
incentives indirectly and cause to firms under invest. Tao Ma (2014) argues that conservatism can cause to 
adverse managers investment incentives and encourage them to ignore positive net present value projects. 
Further, Roy chowdhury (2010) explains that mostly risky projects tend to negative projects, so conservatism 
may motivate risk-aversive manger to give up risky projects even positive net present value for investors. In 
addition, prior researchers argue that conservatism or timely economic loss recognition discipline managers to 
avoid negative net present value projects.  
We follow the previous studies and examine the relationship of conservatism and investment efficiency 
by selecting 142 firms data sample from 6 industries of Pakistan. We check conservatism existence in Pakistani 
accounting practices which will open new debate for researchers and useful for regulators and standards setters. 
We hypotheses that conservatism improves firm’s investment efficiency and reduces the firms from under-over 
investments. Therefore, we examine this association by using 142 Pakistani firms for period from 2006 to 2011. 
Our results predict that accounting conservatism has no significantly effect on investment efficiency in Pakistan. 
More accurately, results show that conditional accounting conservatism does not improve Pakistani firm’s 
investment efficiency and mitigates firms from under-investments. However, this paper evidences that 
conservatism alleviates firms from over-investments and extend the same study literature. This paper contributes 
towards the previous existing literature about conservatism and investment efficiency in context of Pakistan and 
also tries to explain the association of conservatism, investment efficiency and corporate governance in emerging 
market. The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. The next section presents the relevant literature on 
accounting conservatism. We develop our main hypothesis in section 3 followed by our empirical design and 
sample in section 4. We discuss our main empirical results in section 5. Finally section 5 summarizes findings 
and draw conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review: 
Pakistan is developing country and belongs to emerging market. Pakistan legal system is not developed like 
other western countries. We unable to find accounting conservatism literature from Pakistan, however, we can 
discuss corporate governance and legal system of Pakistan which reveals conservatism implication. Parvez R. 
(2012) investigated shareholder rights and legal systems of Pakistan and concluded that legal unfair bias remedy 
in Pakistan is not efficient and weak to compensate against unfair bias petition. Further, Javid Y. &Iqbal R. 
(2010) examined the corporate governance in Pakistan such as corporate ownership, corporate structure and 
corporate finance. They claimed that family and foreign owners conveys good corporate governance and 
monitoring practices consistent with agency theory. Their study also shed a light on law enforcement and 
concluded that firm performance is not associated with legal environment of the countries. The results predicted 
that Corporate Governance Code 2002 possibly alleviates the corporate governance and decision making process 
of listed companies at PSX (Pakistan Stock Exchange). The weak corporate governance system in developing 
countries can support the fact that conservatism mechanism may be present in Pakistani firm’s financial 
statements or accounting practices. Proposed study literature reviewed that more concentrated ownership 
structure demands conservatism. However current study shows accounting conservatism and its economic 
consequences. 
Researchers are investigating effect of conservatism on investment efficiency. The high accounting 
measures leads to a good investment efficiency process and conservatism is a characteristic of the good quality 
accounting.  Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Bushman et al. (2007) investigated the conservatism at a country 
level, which associated with investment efficiency. In line with text, investment efficiency literature influences 
to increase the quality of reporting. In addition, conservatism has positive effect on firm’s corporate governance 
and resolve agency problem.  
The implication of accounting conservatism causes to reduce the agency cost and resolve the moral 
hazards problems between managers and investors. While conservatism decreases the company investment in 
negative projects and also gives the signals to elect positive projects Bushman et al., (2007); Lara et al., (2010) 
and Francis and Martin, (2010) analysed and reported that conditional conservatism is acting a major role in 
easing management agency cost dispute by helping to choose positive projects than negative projects (NPV 
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projects). Lara et al., (2010) examine that conservative firms invest less when likely overinvest and invest more 
when firms likely under invest in years. They also claim that conservatism mitigates firms from underinvestment 
by giving access to external funding at low cost. Further,   Bushman et al., (2007) examined asymmetric 
timeliness of losses (bad news) than gains (good news) in earnings. They showed negative effect of conservatism 
influencing on managers behaviours additional intensely in circumstances where managers fronting worsen 
working environment.  
Despite of that conservatism has negative impacts on managerial behaviour and distorts their 
opportunist behaviour, accounting conservatism acts to improve the investment efficiency of the firms. Timely 
recognition of losses before gains (return earnings) gives the treatment to ease the firms from under (over) 
investments by choosing positive NPV than negative NPV projects. This signalling role of accounting 
conservatism facilitates companies for better investment decisions. Prior research documented that how 
accounting conservatism alleviates the firm’s investment efficiency, to reduce the information asymmetry inside 
(managers) and outside (investors) of the firms, to arise managerial opportunity behaviour etc. Lara et al (2010) 
examined that more implicated  conservative firms have less chances to over (under) invest, also found positive 
association between accounting conservatism and future profitability but unable to evident that more strictly 
followed accounting conservatism firms have less chance to invest in negative or risky projects. Chen et al. 
(2007) found that conservatism bounded manager from managerial accounting manipulation action. Accounting 
conservatism associated with investment efficiency by firm level conservative reporting (Biddle et al., 2009). 
Accounting conservatism affects the investment decisions by limiting to over-investment, providing access to 
external sources of financing to ease from under investment (Francis and martin, 2010; Bushman et al., 2007). In 
line, accounting conservatism improves all the investment monitoring by decreasing incentives of executives on 
negative projects (negative NPV) , also sheds light on the degree of  conservatism, like firms with higher degree 
of accounting conservatism have good future cash flows and lower some special  items charges. Further, 
conservatism to be predicted in the absence of agency problem and offers to external funding at lower cost, 
reduce firm under investment problem. 
 
3. Hypotheses development: 
Prior research examined the association of accounting conservatism and investment efficiency and showed that 
conservatism has significantly positive (negative) impact on investment efficiency. As Watts (2003) stated that 
accounting conservatism improves firm investment efficiency. In line with present study, old studies reported 
that Biddle et al. (2009), Lara et al., (2010, 2015) and Tao (2014) investigated the relationship of accounting 
conservatism with investment efficiency and showed that accounting conservatism may causes (improves) 
investment efficiency. Their proposed studies comb that conservatism alleviates (causes) firms from under-over 
investments. Furthermore, Lara et al. (2010, 2015) investigated and find that more conservative firms are less 
over or under invested. To follow these studies our first and main hypothesis is that conditional conservatism 
alleviates investment efficiency. Our hypotheses are consistent with prior research to depict that conditional 
accounting conservatism causes to reduce the overinvestment. 
The prior research has mixed views about the conditional conservatism and investment efficiency, like 
some found positive and negative association between conditional accounting conservatism and investment 
efficiency. In addition, according to the Garcia Lara et al., (2010), more conservative firms are less likely to over 
and under investment. Conversely, the conditional accounting conservatism causes the firm to over or under 
investment (Tao Ma, 2014), Houcine (2013) also find the association between conservatism and investment 
association in emerging market in context of Tunisian and reported that conservatism does not improve 
investment efficiency in emerging economy. 
Conditional accounting conservatism timeliness information asymmetry (recognising bad news (losses) 
timely then good news (gains)) is increasing investment efficiency by decreasing the overinvestment and 
underinvestment and lowering investment in negative NPV projects. Further, accounting conservatism alleviates 
investment efficiency by giving the access to the firms to finance (external finance) and reducing the cost of new 
funds for the new investment. In other words, give the access to invest in new projects for the sake of reducing 
the underinvestment.  
This paper proposed three hypotheses which are consistent with prior study in line with examine the 
relationship between conservatism and investment efficiency.  
H1: Greater the accounting conservatism and greater the investment efficiency 
H2: Accounting conservatism alleviates firms from underinvestment 
H3: Accounting conservatism alleviates firms from overinvestment 
The above developed hypotheses are consistent with prior research such as they documented the 
conservatism and investment efficiency (over or underinvestment). Bushman et al., (2007); Francis and Martin, 
(2010) and Lara et al., (2010, 2015) examined that conservative accounting choices effecting investment 
decision and limiting firms overinvestment and underinvestment. This paper focuses on the conditional 
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accounting conservatism timeliness information asymmetry effect the investment efficiency, eases firms from 
under-overinvestment. 
 
4. Research design  
In this section, we describe empirical models to examine the conservatism relationship with investment 
efficiency. In our model, specification is based on prior studies on same vein or research topic such as Lara et al., 
(2010, 2015), Tian et al., (2013), Wang (2013), Tao (2014)  and Biddle et al. (2009). First, we measure the 
conservatism by using Basu model (1997), which modified by Khan and Watts (2009) at year firm level and then 
examine how conservatism affects investment efficiency. Further, we explain our sample size to be used in this 
research. 
 
4.1.  Accounting conservatism and investment efficiency  
In old and recent research two methods are very popular to measure conservatism. Both methods are based on 
accounting measure. First method, asymmetric timeliness of earnings introduced by Basu (1997) and second is 
accrual based method produced by Givoly and Hayn (2000). However, these conservatism measure methods are 
based on accounting practices of firm performance. In this study, first we measure the conditional conservatism 
(C-Score) type which is based on model introduced by Basu (1997), however further developed by khan and 
Watts (2009). Basu (1997) investigated that earnings associated with bad news (negative return) than good news 
(positive return). According to Basu (1997), conservatism is defined as the more strict verifiability requirements 
for the recognition of gains relative to losses into accounting earnings. In line with prior research, first we do 
estimation of Basu (1997) standard model and examine incremental timeliness coefficient and we refer as 
CCONS also increases. From these specification and estimation, we find the existence of accounting 
conservatism in Pakistan. Second, i estimate CCONS with investment efficiency with control variables. 
To measure the investment efficiency we imply the Richardson (2006) model to find the investment 
efficiency (over or underinvestment). Accounting techniques and information is important to easing information 
asymmetry problems. These are accounting related effects that projected to improve firms’ investment decisions 
cause to increase the firm values. We measure the residual for firm investment efficiency. If residual more than 
zero is overinvestment, vice versa underinvestment, however if residual is zero then investment is efficient and 
it’s impossible. 
Lara et al., (2010, 2015); Tian et al., (2013) and Wang (2013) documented the association of accounting 
conservatism and investment efficiency and argued that conservatism may cause (reduces) firms from under and 
over investments. As we mentioned above that these tests are based on prior studies which allows analysing the 
influences of accounting choices in reducing firms from under-overinvestment. Moreover, conservatism 
improves investment efficiency by mitigating firms from underinvestment to provide external financing and 
overinvestment to limit manager’s investment decisions. Further, conservatism reduces the agency conflict 
between managers and investors by reducing asymmetric information. We employ following model to capture 
the effects of conditional conservatism on investment efficiency as follows: 
INVRit= CCONSit+FCashfit+MBRS%it+DPOFit+TOP1it+DUALit+SIZEit+MNGRSHit+eit 
Where, INVR is investment efficiency residual of industry i at year t, which we measured from 
Richardson (2006) model, INVR<0, INVR>0 underinvestment and over investment respectively, 
underinvestment if INVR is less than 0 and overinvestment if INVR greater than 0. FCashf is free cash flow, 
MBRS% is percentage of board members, DPOF is dividend payoff, TOP1 is top one shareholder of the firm, 
DUAL is CEO duality, if chairman and CEO are same is equal to 1 otherwise 0. SIZE is firm size and MNGRS 
is manager’s shareholder in the firms. Table 1 explain all variables with detail.  
In line with prior research to analyse the effect of accounting adoptions in reducing over and 
underinvestment and net effect as well. Similarly, we claim that conditional accounting conservatism alleviates 
investment efficiency. In addition, conservatism also reduces the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors. So, accounting conservatism decreases the agency problem by examining corporate governance. 
 
4.2.  Data sample selection: 
This paper examines conservatism relation with investment efficiency in same vein of our objectives. For this 
purpose, a sample of 142 listed companies from non-financial sector is selected with time period from 2006 to 
2011. We use annual reports to get accounting data and market related data from Pakistan stock exchange (PSX). 
Most of the data is extracted from annual reports of listed companies. In our data sample all companies are 
registered in Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX); we only include non-financial companies because financial 
company’s structure, investment environment and accounting practices are different. This panel data consists of 
852 observations. However, after matching all variables data according to year and industry, we estimated 265 
observations to infer our finding and results. 
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5. Empirical findings and results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of all dependent and independent variables. The average, mean, median 
and standard deviation values of investment efficiency are 17.9%, 18.7% and 0.279 respectively. Our measured 
C-Score (CCONS) mean, median and standard deviation values are -3.318, 0.329 and 57.283 respectively. 
Conditional conservatism (CCONS) ranges from minimum of -1423.1 to a maximum 168.5. Prior study also 
suggests that it is difficult to compare descriptive statistics conservatism (CCONS) with prior study, for the 
reason that Givoly and Hayn (2000), Khan and Watts (2009) Lara et al. (2010), used different models to 
calculate accounting conservatism and reported different figures. 
 
5.2. Spearmen correlation analysis 
Table 3 reports correlation between all variables. Correlations table reveals that conservatism and investment 
efficiency only correlated with MNGRSH variable. There is no correlation between conservatism and investment 
efficiency.TOP1 variable negatively correlated with DUAL (CEO duality) and CEO duality variable is positively 
correlated with MNGRSH. However, our all most of independent variables are not highly correlated. So, we 
could not say that multicollinearity exist in the model. In addition, we employ variance inflation factor to detect 
multicollinearity in the model. We find VIF value 4.68 which is not big value but if VIF is 10 or greater than 10 
then multicollinearity problem in model. As a result, VIF test shows that no multicollinearity in control 
variables. 
 
5.3. Regression analysis 
5.3.1. Existence of conservatism in Pakistan 
First, this research examines the existence of conservatism in Pakistan. Table 4 Regression of Basu (1997) model 
shows the conservatism association of earning and returns. This estimation results of cross sectional data of 
Pakistani firms by controlling industry and year effect. The result of this table shows that return (R) variable 
coefficient (β2) is positively significant at 10% level, which is representing that conservatism existing in our 
selected data sample or in Pakistani economy. In sum, this paper finds presence of conservatism in Pakistani 
firms accounting practices or financial reporting.    
5.3.2. Conservatism and investment efficiency 
This section explains the results of conservatism and investment efficiency estimation. Table 5 represents the 
empirical results of this research. Study regression model p-value is less than 1% which indicates the goodness 
of fit of the model. Further, we employ Housman test for random and fixed effect model treatment, then we 
regress regression model by having yearly and industry fixed effect. Therefore, First column of the tables shows 
all independent variables. Second of column reports the estimation of investment efficiency with conservatism 
and control variables. Results report that we did not find significant association of conservatism with investment 
efficiency. This paper, first hypothesis states that conservatism improves the investment efficiency, expecting 
positive relation between conservatism and investment efficiency. Therefore, our finding and results corroborate 
our hypothesis that greater the conservatism, greater investment efficiency from table 5 column 2 results. 
However, we found positive association between conservatism and investment efficiency but based on p-value 
effect is not significant. In same vein, Houcine (2013) studied conservatism and investment efficiency in context 
of Tunis; she also did not find that conservatism has positive significant effect on investment efficiency in 
emerging market. 
However, we find that CEO duality (DUAL) is positively significant at 5% level (coeff. is 0.0864, t-
value is 2.11) with investment efficiency. This finding indicates that CEO and chairman on same position 
increase the investment efficiency. Agency theory claimed that CEO and chairman role in board should be 
separated. In contrast, stewardship theory argued that if CEO working as chairman enhances the company 
performance because there is no information exchange barrier (Suleiman, 2014). Further, Wuchun et al. (2009) 
reported that CEO duality has greater demand for conservatism to improve corporate governance. Size of the 
firm is also positive significant at 1% level (coeff.= 0.0448, t- value= 3.7). This finding reports that bigger firms 
have good investment efficiency. According to Javid & Iqbal (2010), larger firm’s size improves firm 
performance and investment opportunities. 
This paper second hypothesised that conservatism reduces the firm from under investment. We find 
positive association of conservatism and firm underinvestment. However, we unable to find significant results 
(p-value effect). Thus, we reject our null hypotheses to support that conservatism reduce or mitigate firms from 
under-investments at an insignificant level based on p-values. However, this paper evident that conservatism 
reduces the firms from over-investment at significant level based on p-value which is consistent with our third 
hypothesis. Table 5 column 3 results shows that conservatism is negatively significant at 5% level (coeff. -
0.0026, t-value= -2.46) with firms over-investments. Results are consistent with prior research that conservatism 
reduces the firm’s over-investments Lara et al. (2010, 2015);Tian et al., (2013);Wang (2013) and Biddle et al. 
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(2009). However, this study unable to explain that how conservatism reduces the firms from over-investments. 
Further, we find that CEO duality (DUAL) is positive significant at 10% level (coeff. 0.0673, t-value = 1.66). 
Interestingly, this finding shows that CEO and chairman at same position can cause to over-invest. At end, from 
last finding we can say that conservatism mitigates firm from over-investment in Pakistan, this result is also 
indicating that conservatism improves investment efficiency by reducing firms from over-investments. 
 
6. Conclusions & recommendations: 
Timely loss prediction is an oldest and significant characteristic of financial reporting tool. Former literature on 
conservatism and investment efficiency reported that conditional conservatism improves investment efficiency. 
Conservatism improves investment efficiency and reduces under-investments by providing access to external 
funds at lessen interest rate and mitigates firms from over-investments by controlling managers investment 
decisions. In same vein, this paper also investigates the associations of conservatism and investment efficiency 
by using Pakistani 142 firm’s data sample. To infer this study and attain our research objectives, we performed 
Hausman test to select between random and fixed effect model. Therefore, we estimate the regression by keeping 
year and industry fixed effect to infer our results. 
In particular, we found that conservatism is present in financial reporting system of Pakistani firms. 
This finding may open door for researchers in area in same line literature. However, we did not find a positive 
significant relationship between conservatism and investment efficiency. In the light of this finding, 
conservatism does not improve investment efficiency. Although our results are consistent with our hypotheses 
but likewise previous research, however, we unable to find significant value (p-value) to infer our results (Watts, 
2003;Ball and Shivkumar, 2005; Biddle, 2009; Wang, 2013;andLara et al., 2010, 2015). However, this study 
found that conservatism alleviates firms from over-investments. This results indicating that conservatism 
improve investment efficiency by alleviates firms from over-investment in Pakistan. More accurately, this study 
coined accounting conservatism literature and its influence on investment efficiency. 
We consider some limitation in this study. Our sample size is very small and it can affect our finding 
and results. In future, by extending the same vein of study, it will explore in detail that how conservatism 
mitigates firms from under (over) investments. Furthermore, it will be more interesting to put more emphasis on 
conditional conservatism, corporate governance, reporting quality and investment efficiency by selecting a 
multiple period of data sample and associations of variables. We will discuss this in future research with more 
detail and infer conservatism economic consequences.  
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Table 1: Variables & explanation:  
Variables Explanation and Calculation 
CCONS Conditional accounting conservatism calculated from Basu (1997) which is further modified by 
Khan and Watts (2009) 
INVR Investment efficiency residual which is calculated from Richardson (2006) 
FCashf Free Cash flow which is extracted from cash flow statements or cash flow from operations. 
Calculated as cash & cash equivalent =net cash + short term investment 
TOP1  Top one shareholder of the firm. Calculated as holding shares divided by total no. of shares 
MBRS% Member’s percentages which is calculated as committee members divided by no of Directors.  
MNGRSH Managers shares such as Directors, Chief Executive Officer 
and their spouses and minor children. This data extracted from annual report. 
DPOF Dividend payoff and calculated as total dividend pay-out divided by total no. of shares holders. 
SIZE Firm size is natural log of total assets of firm. 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
 Variables No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Div. P25 Min P75 Max 
         
CCONS 851 -3.318 0.3294 57.283 -27.426 -1423.1 27.426 168.5 
INVR 608 0.1794 .187 .2796784 -0.0016 -0.726 0.3608 2.796 
FCashf 773 7.8467 .0224 60.03402 0 -0.017 .1103 1343.1 
MBRS% 388 2.3421 2.3333 .5173929 2 0 2.666 4 
MNGRSH 769 .295341 0 1.998599 0 0 .1435 31.32 
SIZE 852 14.688 14.643 1.6114 0.0058 10.36 0.0595 19.38 
TOP1 770 0.3958 0 1.817271 0 0 0.3762 23.83 
DPOF 823 402174.5 0 2885267 0 0 26640 4.09e-07 
DUAL 401 03392 0 0.4741 1 0 0 1 
Notes: This table shows descriptive for 852 observations firm year during the period 2006 to 2011.This 
table shows mean, median , standard deviation ,25%, 75%, minimum and maximum values. CCONS is 
conditional conservatism (C-sore) which is obtained from khan and Watts (2009) method based on Basu model 
(1997). INVR is an investment efficiency residual which calculated from Richardson model (2006). MBRS% is 
the board of members’ percentage. FCashf is free cash flow. MNGRSH is managers shares including children’s, 
spouse etc. SIZE is firm size, log of all assets. TOP1 is top one share holder in the firm. DPOF is dividend payoff 
.DUAL is CEO and chairman are at same position is 1, otherwise 0, it’s also called CEO duality. For detail see 
Table 1.  
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Table 3: Correlation of variables 
 CCONS INVR FCashf MBRS% DPOF TOP1 DUAL SIZE MNGRSH 
CCONS 1         
INVR 0.0861 1        
FCashf -0.0039 -0.0201 1       
MBRS% 0.0903 0.0113 -0.0036 1      
DPOF 0.0749 -0.0871 0.0363 0.2309* 1     
TOP1 0.053 -0.0319 0.1077 0.1622 0.1702 1    
DUAL 0.0655 0.0754 -0.0656 -0.0271 -0.0771 -0.2276* 1   
SIZE -0.1504 0.1315 0.1989 0.0317 0.149 0.0234 -0.1525 1  
MNGRSH 0.2931* 0.2488* 0.0823 0.0189 -0.0815 -0.1739 0.3051* -0.0686 1 
Note: * is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 4: Regression of Basu (1997) model 
 
Dependent Variable is NetI 
 
Independent variables Sign  Coefficients(t-value) 
 
DR (β1) 
 
(+) 
 
   1.86   (1.06) 
R (β2) (+)    1.82   (1.86)* 
DR*R(β3) (+)    4.49   (2.05)** 
Intercept     4.31   (3.40)*** 
No. Obs.   774 
R-Square   0.02 (2%) 
Note: *significant at the 10% level,**significant at the 5%level and ***significant at the 1% level. 
This table shows the results of Basu (1997) model  
NetIit= β0 + β1DRit+ β2Rit + β3DRit× Rit+eit 
NetI is net income of firm I at year t. R is annual return of firm I at year t. DR is dummy variable, its equal to 
one if Rt is negative, 0 otherwise.eit is error term. 
 
Table 5: Regression results of conditional conservatism and investment efficiency 
 INVR INVR<0 INVR>0 
    
CCONS 0.0001 (0.1) 
0.0001 
(0.14) 
-0.0026 
(-2.46)** 
FCashf 0.0002 (0.38) 
0.0011 
(1.31) 
0.0001 
(0.18) 
MBRS% -0.0088 (-0.25) 
-0.0238 
(-0.61) 
-0.0132 
(-0.36) 
DPOF -0.0025 (-0.69) 
-0.0008 
(-0.3) 
-0.0011 
(-0.27) 
TOP1 0.0028 (0.17) 
0.01375 
(0.75) 
0.0007 
(0.04) 
DUAL 0.0864 (2.11)** 
-0.0005 
(-0.01) 
0.0673 
(1.66)* 
SIZE 0.0448 (3.7)*** 
0.0194 
(1.84)* 
0.0176 
(1.34) 
MNGRS -0.0026 (-0.18) 
0.0176 
(0.25) 
-0.0054 
(-0.39) 
Intercept -0.4658 (-2.38)** 
-0.3719 
(-2.31)** 
0.0576 
(0.26) 
No. Obs. 265 63 201 
Fixed effect or random effect Random Random Fixed 
Year and industry fixed effect No No yes 
Model p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.065 0.087 0.032 
Note: *significant at the 10% level,*significant at the 5% level and *significant at the 1% level. Table 5 
reports conservatism and investment efficiency estimation results. CCONS is C-score or conditional 
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conservatism).INVR is investment efficiency residual.INVR<0, INVR >0 underinvestment and over investment 
respectively, underinvestment if INVR is less than 0 and overinvestment if INVR greater than 0 MBRS% is the 
board of members’ percentage. FCashf is free cash flow. MNGRSH is managers shares including children’s, 
spouse etc. SIZE is firm size, log of all assets. TOP1 is top one share holder in the firm. DPOF is dividend 
payoff .DUAL is CEO and chairman are at same position is 1, otherwise 0, it’s also called CEO duality. For 
detail explanation see Table 1. 
 
Appendix  
A. Conditional conservatism measure model: 
In this study, first we measure the conditional conservatism (C-Score) type which is based on basu model 
measured by (Basu , 1997) , however further developed by khan and Watts (2009).Basu (1997) investigate 
that earnings associated with bad news (negative return) than good news (positive return). 
NetIit= β0 + β1DRit+ β2Rit + β3DRit× Rit+eit                (a) 
Where  
NetIt= Net Income of firm i at year t 
Rt=Annual Return at year t 
DRt= is dummy variable, its equal to one if Rt is negative, 0 otherwise 
In this study, first we measure the conditional conservatism (C-Score) type which is based on Basu 
model developed by (Basu, 1997), however further modified by khan and Watts (2009). Basu (1997) 
investigated that earnings associated with bad news (negative return) than good news (positive return).The 
timeliness of earnings reflects good news and bad news and conservatism at firm level. Ball, Kothari and 
Nikolaev (2009) employed Basu (1997) model to measure conservatism and stated that this model is able to 
capture the cross-sectional changes in conditional conservatism (cited in Lara et al., 2010). Khan and Watts 
(2009) the timeliness of good news refers as G-Score for each year and bad news refers as C-Score and CCONS 
for firm each year.  
G-Score=CCONS=bad news= β3 =µ0+ µ1Sizei+ µ2 MBi+ µ3 Levi              (1) 
C-Score=Good news= β4 =λ0 +λ1 Sizei+λ2 MBi+λ3 Levi                             (2) 
Where µi and λi i= 0 to 3 are firm constant but it’s vary over time. Size is size of the firm and MB is 
market to book value, Lev is referring as leverage of firm i.  In above equations c-Score is measuring 
conservatism of firm year or increasing bad news timeliness.  (Khan and Watts, 2009) C-Score and G-Score are 
varying across firms and year Characteristics (Size, MB and Lev) and increasing variation over time in µi and λi. 
Conservatism is increasing in CCONS (which referred as C-Score in Khan and Watts, (2009)). By substituting 
β3 and β4 in Basu, (1997) model Xi = β1 + β2DRi + β3Ri + β4DRi× Ri +e or in equation (a), we got equation (3). 
The annual cross-sectional regression model used to calculate C-Score and G-Score is: 
Xi = β1 + β2Di + Ri(µ0+ µ1Sizei+ µ2 MBi+ µ3 Levi) + DiRi(λ0 +λ1 Sizei+λ2 MBi+λ3 Levi) + (δ1Sizei + δ2M/Bi + 
δ3Levi + δ4DiSizei + δ5DiM/Bi + δ6DiLevi) + ei                   (3) 
B. Investment efficiency measure model: 
To measure the investment efficiency we imply the Richardson (2006) model to find the investment 
efficiency (over or underinvestment).we measure the residual for firm investment efficiency. If residual 
more than zero is overinvestment, vice versa underinvestment, however if residual is zero then investment is 
efficient (if this happen then misspecification in model). 
, 1 -1 2 -1 3 -1 4 -1 5 -1 6 -1 7 , -1 ,= + + + + + + + +i t it it it it it it i t i tINVEST Growth lev cash size Age return INVα β β β β β β β ε
 
INVESTi,t=Investment expenditure  , I is the firm in t 
Growthi,t-1= Growth opportunity 
Levi,t-1= leverage ((sum of the book value of total debt and book value of total equity) 
cashi,t-1= is the balance of cash , short term investments deflated by total assets measured at the start of the 
year. 
sizei,t-1= Log of the total assets 
Agei,t-1= Log of the number of the years firm has been listed. 
returni,t-1= return of the previous year investment 
Ei,t= residual  
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C. Variance Inflation Factor Test of multicollinearity 
Table A. Variance inflation factor test 
Variables VIF 1/VIF  
   CCONS 1.06 0.998186 
FCashf 1.06 0.960879 
MBRS% 1.06 0.970873 
TOP1 15.09 0.905066 
SIZE 1.13 0.914444 
DPOF 1.16 0.934933 
MNGRSH 15.61 0.972738 
DUAL 1.28 0.973033 
   Mean VIF 4.68  
   
 
 
 
